The recent endorsement by the Government of India of the High-Level Committee’s recommendations, chaired by former President Shri Ram Nath Kovind, to implement synchronised elections has reignited scholarly and political discourse around the feasibility and implications of the One Nation, One Election (ONOE) model. This article undertakes a critical examination of the ONOE proposition by contextualising it within India’s constitutional framework and electoral history. It explores both domestic precedents and global analogues of synchronised elections while analysing insights from various expert committees. The inquiry further delves into the practical, administrative, and normative dimensions of ONOE, interrogating whether such a model strengthens democratic efficiency or threatens the federal equilibrium that underpins India’s pluralist polity. Additionally, it investigates whether ONOE can meaningfully engage with the socio-political cleavages that characterise Indian electoral behaviour—marked by regional diversity, caste affiliations, linguistic identities, and the multiplicity of party systems. In doing so, the article questions whether ONOE signifies a transformative leap toward the government’s envisioned ‘Amrit Kaal’, or whether it portends centralisation at the cost of democratic decentralism.